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Abstract
In existing literature, little attention has
been paid to the problems of how the un-
certainty reflected by natural language text
(e.g. verbal and linguistic uncertainty) can
be explicitly formulated in argumentation
schemes, and how argumentation schemes
enriched with various types of uncertainty
can be exploited to support argumentation
mining and evaluation. In this paper, we
focus on the first problem, and introduce
some preliminary ideas about how to clas-
sify and encompass uncertainty in argu-
mentation schemes.
1 Introduction
Mining and evaluating arguments from natural
language text (Green et al., 2014) is a relatively
new research direction with applications in sev-
eral areas ranging from legal reasoning (Palau and
Moens, 2011) to product evaluation (Wyner et al.,
2012). Argumentation schemes (Walton et al.,
2008) are commonly adopted in this context as a
first modeling tool: it is assumed that natural ar-
guments adhere to a set of paradigmatic schemes,
so that these schemes can be used both to drive
the identification of the arguments present in the
text and, after that, to support their formal rep-
resentation. As a further step, the assessment of
argument justification status requires to identify
the relations among them and to apply a formal
method, called argumentation semantics to derive
the status from these relations. For instance, the
well known1 Dung’s theory of abstract argumenta-
tion (Dung, 1995) focuses on the relation of attack
between arguments and provides a rich variety of
alternative semantics (Baroni et al., 2011) for ar-
gument evaluation on this basis.
∗Corresponding author
1Due to space limitations, we assume knowledge of
Dung’s theory in the following.
When dealing with natural language sources,
one of the challenging problems is to handle the
uncertainty of arguments. In fact, natural language
statements typically include several kinds of un-
certainty. This calls for the need to encompass
uncertainty in the formalisms which are meant to
provide a representation of natural arguments, first
of all in argumentation schemes, in order to avoid
that some useful information carried by the text
source is lost in the first modelling step.
To illustrate this problem, let us consider a sim-
ple example concerning two conflicting natural
language excerpts E1 and E2, possibly taken from
some medical publications:
E1: According to [Smith 98], drug X often
causes the side effect Y.
E2: According to recent experimental trials, it
is highly likely that drug X does not increase the
probability of the side effect Y.
In order to identify argument structures in these
texts, one may resort to specific argumentation
schemes. Referring to the classification proposed
in (Walton et al., 2008), E1 can be represented by
an argumentA1 which is an instance of the scheme
Argument from Expert Opinion, while E2 by an
argument A2 which is an instance of the scheme
Argument From Falsification.
After A1 and A2 are identified, it may be noted
that (though expressed with different linguistic nu-
ances) their conclusions are in conflict: briefly, A1
leads to the claim that X causes Y, while A2 to the
claim that X does not cause Y. As a consequence,
a mutual attack relation between A1 and A2 can
be identified. Then, the arguments and their at-
tacks can be formalized as an abstract argumen-
tation framework AF = ({A1, A2}, {(A1, A2),
(A2, A1)}) and the status of arguments in AF can
be evaluated according to a given argumentation
semantics. For instance, under grounded seman-
tics, both A1 and A2 are not accepted. It must
be noted however that such a modelling approach
(and the relevant outcome in terms of argument
evaluation) overlooks some information which is
(implicitly or explicitly) carried by the text and
that may lead, in particular, to have one of the ar-
guments prevailing over the other. For instance, as
considered in (Bex et al., 2013), one may have a
preference relation over argument schemes so that,
for instance, the scheme Argument From Falsifi-
cation is preferred to the scheme Argument from
Expert Opinion. Accordingly, A2 would be pre-
ferred to A1, and the attack relation would not be
mutual, due to the inability ofA1 to attackA2 (see
the notion of preference-dependent attack in (Bex
et al., 2013)). In this case, we would get a differ-
ent argumentation framework AF ′ = ({A1, A2},
{(A2, A1)}). Then, under grounded semantics,
A1 is rejected, while A2 is accepted.
However, a static preference relation on the
adopted scheme appears too rigid: in most cases
the preference for an argument over another one
is not simply based on their structure but, rather,
on their content. To exemplify, in this case, one
may have different opinions on the reliability of
the source [Smith 98], mentioned in E1, and of
the experimental trials mentioned in E2. More-
over, the two excerpts include several terms ex-
pressing vagueness and/or uncertainty, like of-
ten, highly likely, the probability of, that may
be taken into account in the preference ranking
of arguments. However, this is not possible in
the approach sketched above, since the argument
schemes adopted in the formalization do not en-
compass these forms of uncertainty and the rele-
vant information carried by the text is lost in the
first modelling step.
Given the pervasiveness of vagueness and un-
certainty in natural language this appears to be
a severe limitation for the use of argumentation
schemes in argument mining from texts. To over-
come this problem we envisage the study of ar-
gumentation schemes extended with uncertainty
in the context of the process sketched in Figure
1. Here argumentation schemes with uncertainty
are used to extract arguments from texts, keeping
explicit the relevant uncertainties that can then be
used in the step of argument evaluation using suit-
able abstract formalisms and semantics with un-
certainty. As to the latter step, the study of ex-
tensions of Dung’s framework with explicit un-
certainty representation is receiving increasing at-
tention in recent years (Li et al., 2011a; Thimm,
2012; Hunter, 2013a; Hunter, 2014) while, to the
best of our knowledge, lesser work has been de-
voted to encompassing uncertainty in argumenta-
tion schemes.
This long-term research goal involves several
basic questions including:
1) How the uncertainty reflected by natural lan-
guage text can be explicitly formulated in argu-
mentation schemes?
2) How argumentation schemes enriched with
various types of uncertainty can be exploited to
support argument mining and evaluation?
3) Which is (are) the most appropriate abstract
formalism(s) for the evaluation of arguments with
uncertainty?
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Figure 1: From natural language to argument eval-
uation: a schematic process
By focusing on the first question, this paper
presents some preliminary ideas for encompassing
uncertainty in argumentation schemes.
The paper is organised as follows. We review
some examples of uncertainty classifications in
natural language texts in Section 2 and analyze
the non-uniformity of uncertainty representation
in existing argumentation schemes in Section 3.
Then, in Section 4 we exemplify and discuss a pre-
liminary approach for encompassing uncertainty
in argumentation schemes. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Classifying uncertainty types in
natural language texts
In natural language texts different types of uncer-
tainty can be identified. To give a brief account of
the richness and complexity of this topic and of the
research activities that are being carried out in this
area, we quickly recall some examples of uncer-
tainty classifications considered in the literature.
In the context of scientific discourse, de Waard
and Maat (2012) distinguish knowledge evaluation
(also called epistemic modality) from knowledge
attribution (also called evidentiality). The former
basically concerns the degree of commitment with
respect to a given statement, while the latter con-
cerns the attribution of a piece of knowledge to
a source. Accordingly, different kinds of uncer-
tainty can be identified.
For instance, according to de Waard and Maat
(2012), sources of knowledge may be distin-
guished into the following categories:
1) Explicit source of knowledge: the knowledge
evaluation can be explicitly owned by the author
(‘We therefore conclude that . . . ’) or by a named
referent (‘Vijh et al. [28] demonstrated that . . . ’).
2) Implicit source of knowledge: if there is no
explicit source named, knowledge can implicitly
still be attributed to the author (‘ these results sug-
gest . . . ’) or an external source (‘It is generally
believed that . . . ’).
3) No source of knowledge: the source of
knowledge can be absent entirely, e.g. in factual
statements, such as ‘transcription factors are the
final common pathway driving differentiation’.
Since different sources may have different de-
grees of credibility, this leads to identify a first
type of uncertainty, namely the (possibly implicit)
source uncertainty.
As to knowledge evaluation, de Waard and Maat
(2012), following Wilbur et al. (2006), distinguish
four levels of certainty in the degree of commit-
ment of a subject to a statement: 1) Doxastic (firm
belief in truth), 2) Dubitative (some doubt about
the truth exists), 3) Hypothetical (the truth value is
only proposed), and 4) Lack of knowledge.
This kind of evaluation, called uncertainty
about statements in the following, is typically ex-
pressed through suitable linguistic modifiers.
Actually linguistic modifiers have a quite
generic nature and have been the subject of spe-
cific studies by themselves: Clark (1990) pro-
vides an extensive review of experimental stud-
ies concerning the use of linguistic uncertainty ex-
pressions, such as possible, probable, likely, very
likely, highly likely, etc., and their numerical rep-
resentation. Linguistic uncertainty is pervasive
in natural language communication. On the one
hand, it can be regarded as a form of uncertainty
expression (alternative to, e.g., numerical or im-
plicit uncertainty expressions) rather than as a dis-
tinct uncertainty type. On the other hand, linguis-
tic uncertainty may be regarded as a generic type
of uncertainty, of which other more specific forms
of uncertainty are subtypes. This generic type can
be associated to those natural language statements
to which a more specific uncertainty type can not
be applied. For the sake of the preliminary analy-
sis carried out in this paper, we will adopt the latter
view.
Regan et al. (2002) distinguish between epis-
temic uncertainty (uncertainty in determinate
facts) and linguistic uncertainty (uncertainty in
language) and claims that the latter has received
by far less attention in uncertainty classifications
in the fields of ecology and biology. Linguistic
uncertainty is in turn classified into five distinct
types: vagueness, context dependence, ambigu-
ity, indeterminacy of theoretical terms, and un-
derspecificity, with vagueness being claimed to be
the most important for practical purposes. In fact,
all of them refer in some way to the problem that
some natural language expressions admit alterna-
tive interpretations. Hence this classification is fo-
cused on a specific form of uncertainty and the use
of the term linguistic uncertainty here is rather re-
stricted with respect to other works.
Taking into account the discussion above, in this
paper we consider, as a starting point, three uncer-
tainty types:
1) Source uncertainty, denoted in the following
asU1, concerning the fact that to evaluate the cred-
ibility of different statements one may take into
account the credibility of their sources;
2) Uncertainty about a statement, denoted as
U2, arising in situations where a subject making
a statement expresses a partial degree of commit-
ment to the statement itself;
3)Linguistic uncertainty or uncertainty inside
a statement, denoted as U3, namely uncertainty
generically present in natural language statements,
with no further more precise meaning specified.
For instance in the sentences “According to
[Smith 98], Drug X causes headache” and “Ac-
cording to recent experimental trials, Drug X
causes headache”, one may identify U1 since they
refer the statement “Drug X causes headache” to a
source (a paper and clinical trials, respectively).
On the other hand, the sentence “It is likely that
Drug X causes headache” provides an example of
U2 since the statement “Drug X causes headache”
is not regarded as certain.
Finally, a sentence like “Drug X sometimes
causes severe headache” provides an example of
U3.
For a more articulated example including sev-
eral uncertainty types, let us consider the follow-
ing text, taken from (Swenson, 2014): “. . . , the
Mg inhibition of the actin-activated ATPase activ-
ity observed in class II myosins is likely the re-
sult of Mg-dependent alterations in actin binding.
Overall, our results suggest that Mg reduces the
ADP release rate constant and rate of attachment
to actin in both high and low duty ratio myosins. ”
Here, some expressions (likely and suggest that)
indicate a partial commitment of authors to the
corresponding statements (U2), and the knowl-
edge source is made explicit by the citation of
(Swenson, 2014) (U1). Further, the vague terms
(high and low) correspond to a form of generic
linguistic uncertainty inside the relevant statement
(U3).
3 Non-uniformity of uncertainty
representation in existing schemes
Given that uncertainty pervades natural language
texts and argumentation schemes appear as suit-
able formal tool for argumentation mining from
texts, the question of how to capture uncertainty in
argumentation schemes naturally arises. This ap-
pears to be an open research question, as the state-
of-the-art formulation of argumentation schemes
(Walton et al., 2008) does not consider uncertainty
explicitly, and, more critically, does not seem to
deal with uncertainty in a systematic way, though
somehow recognizing its presence. To exemplify
this problem let us compare two argumentation
schemes2 from (Walton et al., 2008).
The first scheme we consider, called Argument
from Position to Know (APK), is defined as fol-
lows:
Major Premise: Source a is in a position to
know about things in a certain subject
domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: a asserts that A (in domain S)
is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
CQ1: Is a in a position to know whether A is
2Recall that an argument scheme basically consists of a
set of premises, a conclusion defeasibly derivable from the
premises according to the scheme, and a set of critical ques-
tions (CQs) that can be used to challenge arguments built on
the basis of the scheme.
true (false)?
CQ2: Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable)
source?
CQ3: Did a assert that A is true?
In this scheme, no explicit uncertainty is in-
cluded, but the critical questions correspond to
several forms of uncertainty that may affect it.
The second scheme, called Argument from
Cause to Effect (ACE), is defined as follows:
Major Premise: Generally, if A occurs, then B
will (might) occur.
Minor Premise: In this case, A occurs (might
occur).
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case, B will
(might) occur.
CQ1: How strong is the causal generalization?
CQ2: Is the evidence cited (if there is any)
strong enough to warrant the casual
generalization?
CQ3: Are there other causal factors that could
interfere with the production of the effect in
the given case?
In this case, in addition to the implicit uncer-
tainty corresponding to critical questions, explicit
expressions of uncertainty are included, namely
the modifier Generally and the might specifica-
tions in the parentheses.
Clearly the representation of uncertainty in the
two schemes is not uniform (since the second
scheme encompasses explicit uncertainty in the
premises and the conclusion, while the first does
not) but it is not clear whether this non-uniformity
is based on some underlying difference between
the schemes or is just accidental in the natural
language formulation of the schemes. Indeed, it
seems possible to reformulate these schemes in a
dual manner (adding explicit uncertainty mentions
to the first one, removing them from the second
one) while not affecting their meaning, as follows:
APK with explicit uncertainty:
Major Premise: Source a is (possibly) in a
position to know about things in a certain
subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: a asserts that A (in domain S)
is (might be) true (false).
Conclusion: A is (might be) true (false).
ACE without explicit uncertainty:
Major Premise: If A occurs, then B will occur.
Minor Premise: In this case, A occurs.
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case, B will
occur.
The above-mentioned non-uniformity suggests
that a more systematic treatment of uncertainty in
argument schemes is needed in order to face the
challenges posed by the representation of natural
language arguments.
Indeed, a recent work (Tang et al., 2013) ad-
dresses the relationships between uncertainty and
argument schemes in a related but complemen-
tary research direction. While the work described
in the present paper aims at enriching argumenta-
tion schemes proposed in the literature with ex-
plicit uncertainty representation in a systematic
way, Tang et al. (2013) introduce several novel ar-
gument schemes concerning reasoning about un-
certainty. This is done using Dempster-Shafer the-
ory of evidence in the context of a formalism for
the representation of evidence arguments. Differ-
ent schemes basically differ in the choice of the
rule for (numerical) evidence combination among
the many alternative combination rules available
in the literature, and the critical questions in each
scheme refer to the applicability conditions of the
relevant rule (e.g. Is each piece of evidence in-
dependent?). Investigating the possible reuse of
some of the specific ideas presented by Tang et al.
(2013) in the context of our broader modelling ap-
proach is an interesting direction of future work.
4 Encompassing uncertainty in
argumentation schemes
Devising a systematic approach to encompass
natural language uncertainty in argumentation
schemes is a long term research goal, posing
many conceptual and technical questions and chal-
lenges, partly evidenced in the previous sections.
We suggest that such an approach should include
the following “ingredients”:
1) a classification of uncertainty types;
2) a characterization of the uncertainty types
relevant to each argumentation scheme;
3) a formalism for the representation of uncer-
tainty evaluations (of various types) in actual ar-
guments, i.e. in instances of argument schemes;
4) a mechanism to derive an uncertainty evalu-
ation for the conclusion of an argument from the
evaluations concerning the premises and the ap-
plied scheme.
While each of the items listed above is, by it-
self, a large and open research question, we pro-
vide here some preliminary examples of point 2,
using for point 1 the simple classification intro-
duced in Section 2. In particular we suggest that
the scheme specification should be accompanied
by an explicit account of the types of uncertainty
it may involve, while the use of linguistic un-
certainty expressions in the scheme (like in ACE
above) should be avoided within the natural lan-
guage description of the scheme itself. This ap-
proach prevents the non-uniformities pointed out
in Section 3 and enforces the adoption of clear
modelling choices about uncertainty at the mo-
ment of definition of the scheme. In particular, as
evidenced below, it may point out some ambigui-
ties in the definition of the scheme itself.
In the following examples, we explicitly asso-
ciate uncertainty types with the premises of the
considered schemes (that may affected by them)
and with the critical questions (that point out
the potential uncertainty affecting the premises).
Analysing the uncertainty possibly affecting the
scheme itself or its applicability (that may also
be expressed by some critical questions) is left to
future work (and requires a richer classification
of uncertainty types), while, according to point 4
above, the uncertainty about the conclusion is re-
garded as a derived notion and, for the sake of the
present analysis, is considered as derived uncer-
tainty, denoted as DU. The syntax we use to as-
sociate uncertainty types with parts of argument
schemes is as follows: {. . .}[Ux, . . .], where the
part of the scheme (possibly) affected by uncer-
tainty is enclosed in braces and is followed by the
relevant uncertainty type(s) enclosed in brackets.
First, let us consider the APK scheme. Here,
the major premise explicitly refers to a source a,
so it can be associated with U1 (as evidenced by
the critical questions CQ1 and CQ2). Further one
may consider that the inclusion of propositionA in
domain S and the propositionA itself can be spec-
ified with some linguistic uncertainty (U3). As to
the minor premise, since it refers explicitly to a
given assertion, it can be associated with uncer-
tainty about assertions (U2). Actually, the critical
question CQ3 refers to the minor premise and its
statement “Did a assert that A is true?” is, in fact,
ambiguous as far as the type of uncertainty is con-
cerned. On the one hand it might raise a doubt
about the fact that a did actually make any asser-
tion about A, on the other hand it might raise a
doubt about the contents of the assertion made by
a. For instance, a might have made a weaker as-
sertion, like “A is probably true”, or a completely
different assertion like “A is false”. The three
alternatives mentioned above are rather different
and involve different uncertainty types. The pos-
sibility that a made a weaker assertion is a case
of U2, while if a made a completely different as-
sertion (or no assertion at all) about A, the entire
minor premise is challenged, and this amounts to
be uncertain about the credibility of the (implicit)
source from which we learned that “a asserted that
A is true”, hence a case of U1. As this ambiguity
is present in the current formulation of the scheme,
we leave it unresolved and indicate both types of
uncertainty for the minor premise and CQ3.
This leads to reformulate APK as follows:
Major Premise: {Source a is in a position to
know about things in a certain subject
domain S}[U1] {containing proposition
A}[U3].
Minor Premise: {a asserts that A (in domain S)
is true (false)}[U1,U2].
Conclusion: {A is true (false)}[DU].
CQ1: {Is a in a position to know whether A is
true (false)?}[U1]
CQ2: {Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable)
source?}[U1]
CQ3: {Did a assert that A is true?}[U2,U1].
Let us now consider the ACE scheme. Its first
premise is a causal generalization, which, as sug-
gested by the use of (might) in its original formu-
lation, is not always valid. In our simple classifi-
cation this can be regarded as a form of linguistic
uncertainty inside the statement (U3). This kind
of uncertainty may also affect the actual formu-
lation of the statements A and B in the instantia-
tions of the scheme. The major premise is chal-
lenged by CQ1 and CQ2. While their interpreta-
tion allows some overlap, CQ1 seems to concerns
the “strength” of the causal generalization as it is
formulated, while CQ2 refers to the implicit evi-
dential source of knowledge supporting the causal
generalization. Accordingly, CQ1 may be referred
to U3, while CQ2 to U1.
The minor premise concerns the observation of
a fact (the occurrence of A), that might involve lin-
guistic uncertainty U3. Indeed, also the observa-
tion of the occurrence of A might have a source,
so that, in principle, the second premise might
be affected by U1, and one might have an addi-
tional critical question CQ+ like “Does A actu-
ally occur?”, which would turn out very similar
in nature to CQ3 in the APK scheme. The fact
that a question like CQ+ is not considered in this
scheme, points out a further non-uniformity in the
formulation of argument schemes: one may won-
der why a sort of explicit confirmation of the mi-
nor premise is required by a critical question in the
APK scheme, while the same kind of confirma-
tion is not required in the ACE scheme. While one
might answer that similar questions may have a
different importance in different schemes, we sug-
gest that a further analysis is needed to address
these issues in a systematic way and that a clas-
sification of uncertainty types can be very useful
in this respect. To point out this, we add CQ+
in the revised version of the ACE scheme, with
the relevant uncertainty type U1 associated with
the minor premise. Finally, CQ3 raises the ques-
tion about possible other factors interfering with
the causal relation between A and B, i.e. suggests
the presence of possible exceptions in the applica-
tion of the scheme. This kind of uncertainty is not
encompassed in our simplistic preliminary classi-
fication, hence we let it unspecified (denoted as
[??]), as a pointer to future developments. This
leads to reformulate ACE as follows:
Major Premise:{If A occurs, then B will occur}
[U1,U3].
Minor Premise: {In this case, A occurs}
[U1,U3].
Conclusion:{Therefore, in this case, B will
occur} [DU ].
CQ1: {How strong is the causal
generalization?}[U3]
CQ2: {Is the evidence cited (if there is
any) strong enough to warrant the casual
generalization?}[U1]
CQ+: {Does A actually occur?}[U1]
CQ3: {Are there other causal factors that
could interfere with the production of the
effect in the given case?}[??]
5 Conclusions
In recent years, the issue of combining ex-
plicit uncertainty representation and argumenta-
tion has received increasing attention, with sev-
eral works dealing in particular with probabilistic
argumentation (Dung and Thang, 2010; Hunter,
2012; Hunter, 2013b; Li et al., 2011b). These
works are based on formal argumentation the-
ories like Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works (Dung, 1995) or logic-based argumenta-
tion (Hunter, 2013b). This paper suggests that
these investigations on the formal side should be
complemented by efforts on the conceptual and
semi-formal side, with particular reference to the
argumentation schemes model. Argumentation
schemes provide a very intuitive semi-formal rep-
resentation approach for natural arguments and are
indeed adopted in several works as a first level
modelling tool to identify and extract arguments
from natural language texts. However, as evi-
denced in this paper, argumentation schemes need
to be enriched and extended in order to capture
the various kinds of uncertainty typically present
in natural language arguments. The present work
provides a preliminary contribution to this re-
search line, by pointing out some problems and
providing some simple examples of how they
might be tackled. Future work directions are huge
and include an extensive review of the uncertainty
types considered in the literature, with special at-
tention to works in the area of argumentation min-
ing, and a systematic analysis of the various ways
argument schemes may be affected by different
uncertainty types.
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